Abstract-SMS4, a block cipher which employs a special kind of unbalanced Feistel structure, has been accepted as the Chinese National Standard for securing Wireless LANs. This paper investigates the upper bounds of the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities of SMS4-like cipher, in order to evaluate the practical security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. In the same way as for SPN ciphers, if F-function is bijective, we give a simple formula to calculate the minimum number of active F-functions (s-boxes) with regard to the number of rounds and the number of input words in each round. This result provides a convenient tool for the practical security threshold analysis of the SMS4-like cipher against differential and linear attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMS4 [1] is a block cipher which was issued in January 2006. It is mandated for use in the WAPI (WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) standard to protect WLAN products. This is the first commercial block cipher published by Chinese government.
In modern cryptography, differential cryptanalysis (DC) proposed by Biham and Shamir [2] and linear cryptanalysis (LC) proposed by Matsui [3] are the most powerful approaches known for attacking block ciphers. It is a basic requisite for designers to evaluate the security of any new proposed ciphers against these cryptanalyses. A block cipher is called to have "practical security" [4] against differential and linear cryptanalyses if the upper bounds of the maximum differential characteristic (DCH) and linear characteristic (LCH) probabilities are sufficiently small. Furthermore, the upper bounds of these probabilities are usually approximated by the minimum numbers of differential and linear active s-boxes.
With respect to differential and linear cryptanalyses, the practical security of Feistel ciphers [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , unbalanced Feistel ciphers, such as CAST256-like ciphers [9] [10] [11] , and SPN ciphers [12] [13] [14] have been studied. Knudsen [4] showed the lower bound of the number of active Ffunctions (s-boxes) for Feistel cipher when round keys are independent and F-function is bijective. In [5] , Zhang B investigated the practical security against linear cryptanalysis for SMS4-like ciphers with SP round function, gave a formula to compute the lower bound of the number of linear active s-boxes in regard to the number of rounds.
As is well known, generalized Feistel structure provides sufficient flexible in designing the round function [15, 16] , hence we do not always need a SP-type round function. So some experts focus on the minimum numbers of differential and linear active F-functions [17] which can be treated as measurements of generalized Feistel structures with non-SP-type round functions against differential/linear cryptanalysis. Followed by their work, we study SMS4-like cipher whose round function is not limited to SP structure in this paper. We examine the minimum numbers of differential and linear active Ffunctions to estimate the upper bounds of the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities of SMS4-like cipher. The results contribute to this problem in three directions: (1) If m is odd, the minimum number of differential active F-functions is 0 for any number of rounds r; (2) If m is even and F-function is bijective, the minimum number of differential active F-functions is 2k for for the practical security threshold analyses of the SMS4-like cipher against DC and LC. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, a brief description of SMS4 and define SMS4-like cipher will be given. In Sect. 3, we introduce some fundamentals. Section 4 contains the main results of this paper. Section 5 concludes the paper. SMS4 employs a 32-round unbalanced Feistel structure, and both of its block size and key size are 128 bits. The encryption and decryption have the same procedure, but the round subkeys are used in the reverse order. So we will just describe the encryption procedure.
First we introduce some notations. 
Then the ciphertext C is calculated by applying the reverse transformation R to the output of round 31: 
The round function F composes of substitution S and
The substitution layer is made up of four 8×8 bijective sboxes.
The permutation layer is a linear transformation whose input is the output of the substitution layer. Let 
We omit the key schedule algorithm of SMS4 as it is not involved in our analysis, and interested readers can refer to [1] for details.
B. SMS4-like cipher
Inspired by the SMS4, we define the following block cipher scheme, called SMS4-like cipher. Definition 1. Given m ( ) and a positive integer t, the round function of SMS4-like cipher is defined by 
Obviously, the SMS4-like cipher is a Feistel cipher for m = 4, t = 32.
III. PRELIMINARIES
The purpose of this subsection is to give fundamental definitions necessary for later subsections.
, define differential and linear probabilities of
respectively, where a b ⋅ denotes the parity (0 or 1) of bitwise product of a and b. Definition 3. A one-round differential characteristic (one-round DCH) composes of an input difference, an output difference of one round of the block cipher and its probability. An r-round differential characteristic (rround DCH) is the concatenation of r one-round DCH's. An r-round DCH is periodic if the input difference of the first round is equal to the output difference of the last round.
Definition 4. A one-round linear characteristic (oneround LCH) is a list of input, key and output bits of one round of the block cipher and its probability. An r-round linear characteristic (r-round LCH) is the concatenation of r one-round LCH's. An r-round LCH is periodic if the input mask value of the first round is equal to the output mask value of the last round.
The complexities of DC and LC are inversely proportional to the probabilities of the DCH and LCH used in the attacks, respectively. If the maximum DCH and LCH probabilities are so small that the number of plaintextciphertext pairs needed in the attack is greater than that of all plaintexts, then the attacks based on DCH and LCH become inefficient for the block cipher. Therefore, the practical security threshold of the block cipher against DC and LC can be analyzed by evaluating the upper bounds of the DCH and LCH probabilities.
Clearly, the probabilities of trivial DCH and LCH always equal 1, but they have no significance for DC and LC. Throughout this paper we just concentrate on the non-trivial DCH and LCH.
Definition 6. For the SMS4-like cipher, a differential active F-function is defined as an F-function given a nonzero input difference and a linear active F-function as an F-function given a non-zero output mask value.
In this paper, the F-function is bijective and is regarded as a "big" s-box. 
Definition 8 implies that estimating the upper bounds of the DCH and LCH probabilities can be reduced to determining the lower bounds of the numbers of differential and linear active F-functions for the SMS4-like cipher. In the following two subsections, we will give formulas to compute the minimum number of active Ffunctions with regard to the number of rounds and the number of input words in each round.
IV. PRACTICAL SECURITY AGAINST DC AND LC FOR SMS4-LIKE CIPHER

A. Practical Security against DC for SMS4-like Cipher
First we study the one-round DCH of the SMS4-like cipher.
Theorem 1. The probability of one-round DCH ,0 , 1 
then the number of differential active F-functions 
is also a plaintext-ciphertext pair. This is a terrible thing for a block cipher. Theorem 2 means that the number of input words m in the SMS4-like cipher can not be odd to counter DC. In what follows, we consider the SMS4-like cipher with even number of input words in each round. It is easy to verify that if the differential probability with regard to F-function x x Δ → Δ is non-zero (This depends on the F-function.), then the probability of (3) is non-zero and (3) is used to attack the reduced-round SMS4 [18] .
In ( Proof. The strategy of the proof is the same as that of Lemma 3.
Suppose that there exists an (m+1)-round DCH with , denoted by 
From (2) and , it is known that there is only one non-zero value in . This leads to a contradiction because the probability of the r-round DCH is non-zero. 
. 
B. Practical Security against LC for SMS4-like Cipher
The results and their proof about the practical security against LC for the SMS4-like cipher are analogous to that of practical security against DC, so we just present our results in this subsection.
Theorem 4. The probability of one-round LCH ,0 
